Veni | Вени

Essay by Anonymous

(Note by Veni: Published by the Publius Project of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University in three parts – part one, part two, and part three. I combined the three parts, as it as easier for print/read. The article is originally published under CC-BY-SA license. I use CC-BY.)

INTRODUCTION

As part of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society that resulted from the United Nations (UN) World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), governments agreed to set in motion an Internet Governance Forum (IGF), mandating it, among other tasks, to: “Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet Governance…”; “Identify emerging issues…”; “Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet resources”; and “Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet…”

People familiar with this version of international Internet governance* primarily fall into two camps: gung-ho-ers and nay-say-ers. There is a third group as well, who share some characteristics of both camps.

In the gung-ho group are people who are excited about the prospect of Internet public policy taking place under the United Nations (UN) umbrella. This group includes: many individuals from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who enjoy having their voices heard in international discussions on Internet governance; some government officials who embrace the idea of shared control over the Internet; and assorted academics who see a new field of study emerging and relish being at the forefront.

In the nay-sayer camp are people who believe that there is much hype, but little substance, in the talk of international Internet governance. This group includes: various technologists who see the distributed approach to Internet control as natural and who shun restrictive regulation; some government officials who believe a single government can and should go it alone; select academics who see governments as still operating quite independently when it comes to steering the Internet; and many business people who view the whole discussion as a lot of hot air with little chance for substantive impact.

There is a third camp who see the UN process as pointing to UN control over the Internet and do not accept the legitimacy of this campaign. This group views the UN’s treatment of Internet governance as falsely lending the appearance of being ad hoc and auspiciously adaptive; to this group the activity seems more akin to an orchestrated, top-down plan that amounts to a roadmap for UN takeover of Internet governance. Whether this group is supportive of centralized Internet governance is not the point here – rather, the issue is that they disagree with the process because they see it as a sham.

This series of essays is written from the point of view of a person in the third camp. The essays tell how, despite its semblance of spontaneity, the UN’s Internet governance activity actually bears the markings of a well-mapped out plan: a plan for establishing a permanent, international body to oversee global Internet policy – in other words, centralized Internet governance.

The compilation suggests that the UN course so far can be seen as pursuing the same incremental steps that international strategists follow when wishing to establish a permanent body with authority to deal with a given area. The box below outlines these steps.

Steps for establishing a permanent, international body with authority

1. Launch Study – Suggest the creation of a study group to figure out how best to treat issues; this group should report back after a set time.

2. Be Inclusive – Open discussion in a way that elevates likely supporters and dilutes the power of those who stand to lose.

3. Avoid Conclusions – To seem innocuous and disarm those fearing change, limit results with an inconclusive final report; make it clear that more work is necessary.

4. Receive Commission – Set in motion processes to (a) facilitate dialogue, and (b) promote information exchange (“cooperation”) among relevant agencies.

5. Stay Mainstream – Initiate work on non-contentious issues. Be perceived as a facilitator responding to demand, not a driver pushing centralization.

6. Celebrate Harmony – At the end of the time period set for discussion, call attention to achievements in bringing groups together and navigating through rough terrain; show how the process has materialized.

7. Salvage Cooperation – Use the lack of response in the cooperation process to draw attention to the need for leadership.

8. Become Established – Watch collaborators in a decision-making group successfully advocate keeping the momentum going by establishing a permanent body to continue the process in an institutionalized fashion.

9. Expand Authority – Assume additional functions to expand authority over time.

TO FOLLOW

The second essay in this series describes the application of these steps in the context of UN Internet governance as some would have it. The third essay highlights some reasons for concern and suggests that participation in the process may nonetheless be the best way forward given those reservations.

As presented in the first essay, the course of Internet governance may be following the same incremental steps that international strategists follow when wishing to establish a permanent body with authority to deal with a given area. The steps as applied to recent moves for Internet governance under a UN umbrella are detailed below.

1. Launch Study

Normally friction comes as in-the-know people with interests (“stakeholders”) weigh in on policy decisions at the national level; then there is the added chafing that comes when different countries’ governments come together to try to hash out policies. But bring those in-the-know stakeholders from different countries together at the international level, and the possibilities for opinion clashes are endless.

Hence, it was predictable that the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) would unleash cacophony in convening thousands of people with varied interests in Geneva (December 2003). Anticipating the mêlée, a negotiating group on Internet governance drafted language for the WSIS Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. They proposed a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) to prepare for the second phase of WSIS, to be held in Tunis (November 2005). Faced with hordes of people clamoring for attention to their myriad concerns, what government decision-maker could disagree with such a proposal?

The WGIG was thus created with a mandate to define (a) what should be conceived of as Internet governance, (b) what the public policy issues were that were relevant to this area, and (c) what the respective roles and responsibilities of stakeholders should be.

As any seasoned international negotiator knows, setting up a study group is the first step to agreeing new rules. Anyone not wanting new rules lost this battle.

2. Be Inclusive

In convening the WGIG, organizers conducted open consultations so as to enable any interested participant to contribute, with these inputs then feeding into work by an expert group. The process went far in enabling transparency and public participation.

If the ultimate goal was to establish a permanent UN agency to deal with Internet governance, the inclusive mode was brilliant. By bringing NGOs, businesses, and academic institutions into a setting normally reserved for governments, organizers could elevate these non state actors and dilute the power of governments – especially those governments wielding extra strong influence over Internet policy. Psychologically, non-state actors were on par with governments in this international process.

In the meantime, the WGIG process was setting the precedent for what would be accepted as fulfilling the call in the Declaration of Principles that “the international management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations…” In particular, the open participation would cause some people to view the centralized, UN process as affording direct representation and thereby being more democratic than the traditional mode of governments representing their publics at the international level. Of course, others might contend that stakeholders participating in WGIG consultations did not represent the public, but by and large people with this critical view stayed away – meaning that for the most part the voices present were those feeling empowered by the new mode.

3. Avoid Conclusions

For a negotiator wanting a study process to turn into something more prolonged and eventually permanent, an important way to avoid ringing alarm bells is to go slowly. After all, an initial study that produces revolutionary recommendations is sure to draw attention and attract opposition. Findings that are inconclusive are much more palatable and do not appear to be biased toward any particular agenda.

One way to avoid producing substantial findings is to limit the amount of time spent developing them. Perhaps this is why roughly half of the time allotted for WGIG work was “wasted” with the procedural matter of composing an expert group that would be politically acceptable.

Another technique is to put forward a mixed bag of options that satisfies nobody.

In the case of WGIG, the final report accomplished this beautifully, particularly the four models proposed for “Global Public Policy and Oversight”.

4. Receive Commission

The inconclusive WGIG report left it to government negotiators preparing for the second phase of WSIS to haggle over a path forward. With roughly 19,000 people traveling to Tunis to champion a multitude of concerns at that meeting, governments had to produce some form of agreed text so as to stay in a position of leadership. After last-minute horse trading, governments endorsed the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.
In this document, governments extracted elements of the WGIG report and agreed to two notable Internet governance processes: First, they agreed to have the UN set up an Internet Governance Forum (IGF), mandating this forum, among other matters, to: “[d]iscuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet Governance…”; “[i]dentify emerging issues…”; “[d]iscuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet resources”; and “[h]elp to find solutions to the issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet…” Second, they agreed for the UN to lead a process of “enhanced cooperation” whereby the UN would promote improved ties among entities dealing with international Net policy. The same officials who had chaired the negotiating group that proposed WGIG and who had led WGIG would now continue to shepherd these processes.

5. Stay Mainstream

If the end goal is to establish a permanent, centralized body for Internet governance under the UN, a key strategy at this stage is to show demand for central coordination and to demonstrate this capability in a mild way, as a facilitator.

In the forum process, the key is thus to focus on non-contentious issues that stakeholders say require international cooperation. The IGF has done so first by convening consultations and receiving written inputs to hear what stakeholders’ concerns are, and then by selecting problems nobody can deny (e.g., spam and online child pornography) for concerted efforts. The IGF then facilitates dialogue by offering a forum where stakeholders in a position to tackle issues collectively can meet.

In addition to starting with non-contentious issues, it makes sense to categorize work under banners that nobody can disagree with politically, such as the themes of IGF meetings in Athens (2006) and Rio de Janeiro (2007): “Access”, “Diversity”, “Openness”, “Security”, and “Critical Internet Resources”. Such banners help to avoid conflict concerning values (e.g., human rights) and allay qualms on the part of governments that fear the process will force them to make changes. After all, at this point governments are still the decision-makers in the international system.

It is also strategic to continue with the arrangement that dilutes the power of those who stand to lose, i.e. governments. As long as non-state actors are present, they will issue calls for equal air time and wish to be on the same footing as governments. All that the organizers need to do is to create space for the non-governmental stakeholders.

(Of course, sometimes these stakeholders can stand a little prodding. By way of illustration, the first “Dynamic Coalition” on its surface seemed to spring up spontaneously as a result of a multi-stakeholder panel on privacy at the first IGF meeting in 2006. While this and later Dynamic Coalitions are billed as something that stakeholders came up with, in fact it was an official from a government that favors a restructuring of Internet governance who planted the idea. These Dynamic Coalitions in turn have become the recognized vehicles for civil society input to IGF meetings. In their meetings between IGF meetings, they are helping to give institutional form to the IGF.)

Turning to the process of “enhanced cooperation,” it is strategically important to take a somewhat passive approach initially, since being too proactive could alert people to a trend toward institutionalization and backfire. Instead, what is required at this juncture is to appear nonchalant. By inviting agencies involved in Internet governance to initiate their own cooperation and to report on it, the process leaders can avoid criticism for trying to promote centralization. Most likely, these agencies will prove reluctant to respond, for they are not subject to this enhanced cooperation process and do not wish to create the impression that they are. They have no real way to object, however, for an organized, collective response can be converted into a sign of success in the process’ ability to promote cooperation; meanwhile, simply remaining silent does not alert others to the inappropriateness of the enhanced cooperation process’ telling them what to do. They are stymied.

6. Celebrate Harmony

It is foreseeable that the IGF will use its five-year mandate not to establish any sort of ranking of concerns, but rather to show that there is a mish-mash of concerns, and that so far the process has shown constructive engagement among all stakeholders.

Stakeholder groups will still be responding to the call for participation and coming together to clamor for attention. Their own processes will have become more streamlined and formalized. Not only will they help to give the impression that there is demand for a permanent body in which people can talk, but also they will serve to show that the IGF has materialized into a veritable structure. As suggested above, the meetings-between-meetings by self-organized, multi-stakeholder groups like Dynamic Coalitions represent a sort of institutionalization of the IGF.

Even voices of dissent can be translated into expressions of support, cited as evidence that the process is inclusive. Once the IGF has demonstrated its capacity to serve as an inclusive forum where all views may be expressed and heard, who will be able to argue against it? Making the case for a permanent body just got easier.

7. Salvage Cooperation

With reference to the process of enhanced cooperation, the agencies involved in Internet policy are unlikely to fall in line with the dictates of a process that has no authority over them. Hence, they will appear recalcitrant. It will then be logical and acceptable for the light-handed coordinators of the process to assume more pro-active positions.

8. Become Established

Under the bicycle theory, certain government delegates advocate keeping the momentum going and establishing a permanent body to continue the forum’s process of dialogue in an institutionalized fashion. (They may do so, for example, at a follow-up, WSIS-style meeting.) As for enhanced cooperation, the pro-centralization group may call attention to the fact that agencies dealing with the Internet have been slow to exchange information, suggesting that decision-makers should give central organizers a greater role in prompting cooperation. If made permanent, the scope of such mandates will likely expand as the Internet becomes more and more pervasive in the information society.

9. Expand Authority

Once established as a permanent body to host discussions and coordinate agencies, the institution can begin to exercise more authority. This movement appears natural as the institution becomes indispensable in serving as a central point for information exchange. Early efforts will entail convening meetings, coordinating among agencies, and conducting consultations.

Having set a precedent for exercising authority, the body takes on additional functions incrementally. In this way, the institution will morph from being a place for information exchange, to being a place where decisions of consequence are taken. Leaders may justify this expansion of functions as fitting under the body’s coordination role: after all, it is only natural that coordination would begin to affect the actual workings of Internet policy. To strengthen their position, these leaders can highlight improvements in agencies’ operations due to the cooperation.

After a period, organizers may see to it that proposals are put forward to expand the institution’s official authority and to formalize what it has been practicing. So, for example, instead of just discussing public policy issues related to Internet Governance, members can set policy at meetings hosted by the institution; this would be a logical juncture to add other competencies as well, such as the management of critical Internet resources and dispute resolution.

The first essay in this series introduces the idea that the course of Internet governance may be following the same incremental steps that international strategists follow when wishing to establish a permanent body with authority to deal with a given area. The second essay details the steps as applied to recent moves for Internet governance under a UN umbrella. This final essay discusses reasons for concern and suggests that participation in the process may nonetheless be the best way forward given those reservations.

REASONS FOR CONCERN

There are at least three reasons for serious concern over what appears to be a roadmap for centralization of Internet governance under the UN, as described in the previous two essays. First, there is no place for true dissent. Second, unless institutionalization carries a commitment in advance to recognize civil and political rights, it is risky to assume that the end institution will consider these values foundational for the policy framework of the information society. Third, as ubiquitous computing blends the physical and virtual worlds, an overarching UN body coordinating Internet policy will be empowered with an extremely broad mandate.

• No place for dissent

Whereas dissent would normally be an option, the roadmap for institutionalization will allow for no obstruction: Even voices of dissent can be translated into expressions of support, cited as evidence that the process is inclusive.

Arguably, stakeholders are being used to give the appearance of democracy and to legitimize the process of establishing a permanent body to deal with Net-related, public policy issues at the international level. Participation in effect is a contribution toward centralized Internet governance.

People who disagree with what is taking place face a paradox: The very act of organizing opposition can be captured and used by proponents of central control as evidence that the UN process is inclusive and legitimate, providing for dissent and serving as a necessary center for debate. In other words, dissenters’ voices may add volume to the discussion on international Internet governance and lend it legitimacy. This would-be opposition group thus confronts the quandary that it may be counter-productive even to come together. For them, the question is whether to resist a force that is advancing, or to join it so as to infuse its ranks and influence its direction.

One therefore wonders if taking the discussion elsewhere is even possible. Just as dissent within the official forum is used as confirmation that the process is inclusive and therefore a good one, dialogue involving people beyond the elite insiders could also inappropriately be cited as proof that the public is interested in institutionalization. On the one hand it is unappealing in any way to be part of a process that distorts dissent and repackages it as support for institutionalization; on the other hand disengagement might boil down to a choice to forego the opportunity to influence the direction of Internet governance.

• No guarantees for democracy and human rights

Centralization might be acceptable if it had guarantees for democracy and human rights as its foundation, and if it provided appropriate redress in case of a violation. At the moment it does not have these commitments. Rather, the objective seems to be to promote centralization rather than to hold freedom as the paramount concern.

The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) has structured discussion in such a way that it does not give preeminence to foundational principles like those found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This lack of elevation would seem to suit those who favor the centralization of Internet governance under the UN: For them, the strategic stance at this stage is to have the IGF be inclusive and politically agreeable to the UN’s wide membership, with a view to obtaining a permanent mandate. However, if there is no attempt to recognize fundamental values at this stage, it is risky to assume that the end institution will consider them foundational in building a policy framework for the information society.

It is unappealing to think that in participating in discussions of the IGF, one is contributing to the establishment of such a standing institution, especially when at the outset it is impossible to know what shape this institution will take and what principles will guide it.

• The inside-out likelihood of online rules applying to the physical world

The matter is particularly pressing given the pace of technological change and the difficulty of changing international decisions once agreed. As the Internet infuses the information society and people find themselves living in a ubiquitous computing environment, global rules for Internet interactions will extend into the realm that used to be thought of as the distinct, real world. In that sense, international Internet governance must be understood as an early form of global governance that reaches into countries, local regions, neighborhoods and homes.

Given the pervasive role that the Internet will play in the future Information Society, a permanent international institution with an expansive mandate would essentially represent a significant step toward global governance.

Governments have already agreed on numerous treaties and have accepted standards that arguably add up to a framework for governing the Internet. These international rules will likely serve as the default ones the more that the virtual world bleeds into the physical world. For example, a person using a networked device to receive location-based services may be exchanging information with entities in several jurisdictions at once, even as he is trying to obtain information about a physical place immediately in front of him – perhaps even his home. Such services will be facilitated by global rules crafted to enable e commerce and security, and these global rules will, in an inside-out way, end up extending to that person’s experience with his local surroundings.

In other words, the question of centralization is not merely an esoteric one for people specialized in the technical workings of the Internet. Rather, it concerns everyone as the implications come to their doorsteps and even reach inside their homes.

CONCLUSION

Certain actors have been pushing for centralized Internet governance under the UN’s umbrella. The road map for this centralization arguably began with a move to position the UN as the arbiter of all actors in the information society, with governments placed on the same level as corporations and non-profits, and other stakeholder groups. The idea is that, once this multi-stakeholder forum is made permanent, it will stand as the logical point for coordinating Internet policy. Central coordination can gradually turn into administration, with decision-making functions subtly added. This international Internet governance has potential to evolve into global governance generally as the Internet increasingly infuses the physical world.

Centralization appears inevitable given the course so far, particularly since participating in discussions about this trend – even if to dissent – is interpreted as evidence of demand for a permanent place for global dialogue, and since disengagement prevents one’s voice from being heard. If fundamental freedoms are to be the founding principles of future society, they may need to be enshrined in this early stage of international Internet governance. Perhaps the best chance of enshrining these principles lies in flooding the IGF dialogue with the message that these values must be the bedrock of any system for Internet governance.

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* The term “Internet governance” deserves an explanation. Because the UN’s Working Group on Internet Governance defined the term for the purposes of UN discussions, and because the UN’s moves in this area are a main concern here, this paper uses their wide definition: “Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” This broad definition is interesting because it means that UN work on Internet governance is not limited to Internet addressing and routing (e.g., matters handled by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, or ICANN) or matters relating strictly to the seven layers of the Internet’s infrastructure (dealt with by groups like the Internet Engineering Task Force, or IETF); rather, the definition allows UN work on Internet governance to expand outward and encapsulate anything relating to the evolution or use of the Internet.